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Abstract 
The present study is interested in whether recognition memory errors made from snap 
decisions can be detected and corrected.  Fifty two participants from the University of 
Tasmania made a two-stage recognition decision to words in a test list. The first decision, 
was a fast (<1sec) recognition memory (old/new) decision; the second a slower confidence 
response (high, low, change of mind). Words in the test list were manipulated for frequency 
(high, low), in the English language, and concreteness (high, low).  Analysis of the change of 
mind responses showed an equal reduction from first response to second in the false alarm 
rate for both high frequency and low frequency words, and a significantly larger 
improvement in the hit rate for low frequency words from first response to second. Changed 
responses had a longer processing time (680ms) than unchanged responses (390ms). A 
significant word frequency mirror effect was also found, but not a significant word 
concreteness effect. The results indicate that participants can detect and correct errors made 
from quick decisions, and have important implications for the ability of decision making 
models’ to predict correct responses, and for reducing the noise in speed-accuracy trade-off 
experiments (Rabbitt, 1969).  
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Recognition memory tasks for words have long been used in research to understand 
the decision-making process. The aim of the research has been to determine the mechanisms 
underlying recognition based decisions in order to develop theories and to develop models 
that can predict the probability of making one decision over another. However, a limitation of 
these models is that they do not account for the fact that a person may make an incorrect 
decision, realise this, and therefore wish to correct it. In experiments manipulating reaction 
time, such as speed-accuracy trade-off designs, participants make errors, which often leads to 
slower reaction times on the immediate subsequent trials (Rabbitt, 1969). This slowing down 
creates noise in the data. Rabbitt theorised that participants slowed down in order to improve 
their accuracy. This suggests that participants knew they had made an error, and thus were 
being more cautious to prevent more errors from occurring. If participants can detect they 
have made an error, then it should follow that they can correct it. Therefore, if experimental 
designs for speeded reaction time tasks include a mechanism that allows participants the 
chance to correct an error, it may reduce the slowing down of responses on subsequent trials, 
and thus reduce the noise in the data.  
In order to determine whether fast errors can be detected and corrected, the present 
study is interested in the effects of snap decision making on episodic recognition memory for 
words. Words in the study lists will have either a high or low natural language frequency, and 
be either high or low in concreteness (i.e., non-abstract and abstract). Participants will be 
required to make a two-stage decision. The first decision will require them to make snap (i.e., 
within one second) recognition (old/new) decisions to test words, where an old response is 
given if the participant thinks the test word was in the study list, and a new response if not. 
Following this initial decision, participants will make a confidence rating on whether they 
were highly confident in their initial decision, had low confidence, or would like to change 
their mind.  
3 
 
 
 
Episodic memory is the memory system responsible for storing past information 
about personally experienced events and related temporal information such as when events 
happened and where (Tulving, 1972; Tulving, 1984; Tulving, 1985; Tulving, 1995). 
Recognition is defined as the ability to determine whether a test item has been previously 
studied in the present context (Norman & Wickelgren, 1969). Tulving (1984) distinguishes 
recognition from recall, as recognition involves both a sense of familiarity when viewing the 
stimulus item and an internal cue such as ‘was this in the study list?’, whereas recall involves 
only retrieving an item from memory based on the internal cue. In recognition memory tasks, 
the episodic memory system is engaged as participants must recollect temporal information 
about the test item in order to recognise it.  
Mirror Effects 
In recognition-memory tasks for words, high frequency (HF) words produce greater 
false alarm rates (incorrectly identifying a new word as old) than low frequency (LF) words 
and; LF words produce greater hit rates (correctly identifying old as old) than HF words. The 
mirroring of the hit rate for LF words to the false alarm rate for HF words is known as the 
word frequency mirror effect (WFE; Glanzer & Adams, 1985) and is a robust finding in the 
literature (e.g., Bridger, Bader & Mecklinger, 2014; Glanzer & Adams, 1990; Malmberg, 
Steyvers, Stephens & Shiffrin, 2002; Stretch & Wixted, 1998).  
A mirror effect also occurs for word concreteness, where high concrete words have a 
greater hit rate than low concrete words, and the low concrete words are more prone to false 
alarms (e.g., Glanzer & Adams, 1990; Gorman, 1961; Groninger, 1976; Winograd, Cohen & 
Baressi, 1976). The hit rate portion of the concreteness mirror effect is believed to be due to 
the fact that high concrete words can be better encoded during study because images can be 
attached to them, whereas low concrete words are harder to associate with an image (Paivio, 
1969). The false alarm rate portion most likely occurs due to the new low concrete words 
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being similar either orthographically or phonetically to study list words, or because their 
semantic meanings are similar to study list words, thus they are mistaken as old words 
(Glanzer & Bowles, 1976; Hirshman & Arndt, 1997; Wixted, 1992).  
Gorman (1961) studied word frequency and word concreteness together and found 
that the mirror effect for word frequency was independent of word concreteness. This means 
that regardless of how concrete or abstract a word was, LF words still had a greater hit rate 
than HF words, and HF words still had a greater false alarm rate than LF words. Glanzer and 
Adams (1990) found that a combined mirror effect only occurred when they enhanced the 
memory strength for old concrete words during the study phase. They suggested that this 
strengthening was required in order to increase the difference in effectiveness between word 
frequency and word concreteness.  
Dual Process Models 
Studies (e.g., Gronlund & Ratcliff, 1989) involving the recognition of items and item 
pairs highlight how two processes are required to explain recognition memory decisions, as 
they show that the recognition of a single item can be made by a quick familiarity based 
decision, but the recognition of an item pair requires a more elaborative and slower search of 
memory. Dual process theories propose that recognition memory decisions are made based 
on two separate processes: familiarity and recollection.  
Atkinson and colleagues (e.g., Juola, Fischler, Wood & Atkinson, 1971; Atkinson & 
Juola 1973) propose a familiarity model of recognition memory that conditionally searches 
memory for elaborative information. Their model assumes that test items have familiarity 
values that can be measured on a continuous scale. Target items are assumed to have a higher 
mean familiarity value than lure (new) items, but the distributions for these may overlap. The 
subjective familiarity of a test item leads to the decision that the item is old or is new, and this 
decision is made based on set criterion levels. If a high criterion level is reached then an old 
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response is given, if a low criterion level is not reached a new response is given. The model 
assumes that these old and new familiarity based decisions are made quickly. However, 
Atkinson and colleagues propose that if the familiarity value falls somewhere between the 
low and high criterion levels then a more thorough, and therefore slower, search of memory 
occurs in order to make a decision. The model also proposes that repetitions of both target 
and lure items in the test list increases the mean familiarity distributions for each. This 
therefore increases the probability of a lure item requiring a more thorough search of memory 
in order to correctly reject it. However, increasing the mean familiarity of target items makes 
them more recognisable, thus they do not require a more thorough search of memory. 
Mandler, Pearlstone and Koopmans (1969) proposed a similar dual process model to 
Atkinson and colleagues, as their theory assumes that recognition decisions are made based 
on familiarity alone if a criterion level is reached. However, if that criterion is not reached 
then a more thorough searching of memory occurs in order to find relative associative or 
elaborative information to correctly recognise the item, or to reject the item if no supporting 
evidence is found. In terms of word frequency, Mandler (1980) proposed that the familiarity 
of a word can be increased incrementally, such that increased exposure to a word makes it 
more familiar. As HF words are already highly familiar, the increase in familiarity a HF word 
receives at study is not proportional to the increase in familiarity a LF (and thus unfamiliar) 
word receives. This means at test old LF words can be easily discriminated from LF lures, as 
the difference between the familiarity values is large. Old HF words however are harder to 
discriminate from HF lures, as the difference between the familiarity values is small. 
Therefore, Mandler propose that the WFE occurs due to differences in the familiarity values 
between HF and LF words at test. Mandler (1980) further extended his original model to 
explain that familiarity and recollection for an item initiate together and operate in parallel, 
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but familiarity responses occur faster than recollection responses, thus differentiating his 
model from Atkinson and colleagues’ model.  
Jacoby and Dallas (1981) through a series of experiments proposed that recognition 
memory is based on two concepts: relative perceptual fluency, meaning that familiar items 
are processed more fluently than unfamiliar ones and; elaboration, meaning that an item can 
be recognised by the associated information attached to it (e.g., the last context it was 
encountered). Fluent decisions, they argue, are made faster than elaborative decisions, and 
both systems can initiate together but work independently in parallel, which resembles other 
dual process theories that propose familiarity and recollection do the same.  
Yonelinas’ (1994) dual process model assumes recognition is based on both 
familiarity and recollection. He described familiarity in terms of signal detection theory. 
Signal detection theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966) proposes that people make recognition 
decisions based on the strength with which a stimulus item matches their memory for the 
item. Item strength is measured in terms of a pre-set criterion level, which if reached 
produces an old response. If this criterion level is not reached then the item is determined to 
be new as there is not a strong memory for the item. Old items are thought to produce greater 
familiarity distributions than new items, with the difference between the two distributions 
being the degree of discriminability (d’). Yonelinas described recollection as the 
remembering of qualitative information about the stimulus item (i.e., contextual information) 
that can be used to ultimately determine whether the item was previously encountered or not. 
Yonelinas therefore described recollection as being an all-or-none process that does not have 
a response criterion. This means that the probability of a recollection response occurring 
remains fixed. Therefore, Yonelinas also assumed that recollection is independent of the false 
alarm rate. This theory further predicts that recollection responses should only be given in 
high confidence. Like previous models, Yonelinas’ model assumes that familiarity and 
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recollection initiate in parallel but operate independently, with familiarity responses 
occurring faster than recollection responses. 
In summary, dual process theories are in general agreement that recognition memory 
decisions are based on familiarity and recollection. They further agree that these two 
processes initiate together but operate independently, with familiarity responses being made 
faster than recollection responses.  
Likelihood Ratio Models 
 An alternative explanation to the one provided by dual process theories for 
recognition memory decisions are likelihood or log-likelihood ratio models. Osth, Dennis and 
Heathcote (2017) explain that log-likelihood models are a transformation of fixed strength 
signal detection models (i.e., models that have a fixed lure distribution) into a log-likelihood 
ratio. The ratio is created by taking a single item’s strength and calculating the logarithm of 
the likelihood that the item is a target and dividing this by the likelihood that the item is a 
lure. Repeating this for the entire strength distribution of all conditions results in a mirror 
ordered log-likelihood ratio of distributions. For example, the mirror order for an experiment 
with two conditions (e.g., weak and strong) would be as follows: the lure distribution mean in 
the strong condition would be lower than the lure distribution mean in the weak condition, 
thus resulting in the strong condition having a lower false alarm rate than the weak condition 
and; the target distribution mean in the strong condition would be above the target 
distribution mean in the weak condition, thus resulting in the strong condition having a higher 
hit rate than the weak condition.   
Attention/Likelihood theory (Glanzer & Adams, 1990; Glanzer, Adams, Iverson & 
Kim, 1993) proposes that attention plays a key role during learning (i.e., information 
encoding) and that likelihood ratios play a key role in making a recognition decision. Glanzer 
and colleagues theory evolved from strength theories, which postulate that recognition 
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decision are made based on item strength, where a test item has features sampled until either 
a pre-set criterion is met, resulting in an old response, or is not met, resulting in a new 
response (e.g., SDT). Attention/Likelihood theory goes one step further to propose that the 
recognition decision is made based on the evaluation of the likelihood ratio that the item is 
old or is new given the item’s strength.  
Dennis and Humphrey’s (2001) Bind Cue Decide Model of Episodic Memory 
proposes that recognition of words requires the use of a cue to retrieve the context in which 
the test word was previously encountered. The theory has three key mechanisms: a binding 
mechanism, which explains how elements of an episode bind together in episodic memory; 
the cue, which initiates the retrieval of memories and; the decision rule, which determines the 
end result (e.g., the old or new decision) and is dependent on the likelihood ratio. Other 
theories such as Shiffrin and Steyvers’ (1997) Retrieving Effectively from Memory model, 
and McClelland and Chappell’s (1998) Subjective Likelihood in Memory model also propose 
that there is a likelihood ratio mechanism behind recognition memory decisions.  
When the Word Frequency Mirror Effect Fails 
Hoshino (1991) conducted four experiments on recognition memory tasks for words and 
found that in the first three experiments the WFE was not found, as participants appeared to 
have a bias to respond old to HF words, thus reducing the hit rate advantage for LF words. 
However, in the fourth experiment, which used the same word lists as the first three, he had 
participants first complete a lexical decision task (i.e., identification of word and non-words) 
to better encode the study list words, and as a result the usual mirror effect was found. 
Hoshino proposed that people use a common criterion to discriminate HF words from LF 
words, and that the mirror effect occurs when the familiarity distribution for LF words is 
much greater than the distribution for HF words. From these findings, Hoshino theorised that 
the increased false alarm rate for HF words is due to greater confusion in tracing the previous 
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context in which the HF word was encountered, whilst the increased hit rate for LF words is 
due to a more thorough encoding (i.e., of contextual and temporal information) during study, 
which reduces any confusion.     
Joordens and Hockley (2000) propose that the mirror effect occurs due to LF words being 
less pre-experimentally familiar, thus leading to a lower false alarm rate compared to HF 
words which are highly familiar. The lack of familiarity for LF words makes them more 
memorable, and thus easier to recollect during a test, which results in a hit rate advantage. 
Due to the hit rate advantage for LF words being tied to recollection, Joordens and Hockley 
theorised that the hit rate portion of the WFE is variable, as recollection can be manipulated, 
but the false alarm rate portion of the WFE remains constant. In a series of studies they 
showed that when the ability for recollection to occur was reduced, the hit rate advantage for 
LF words was reduced or reversed, whilst the greater false alarm rate for HF words remained 
the same. One of their studies manipulated response time, such that some trials had unlimited 
time in which participants could make their old/new recognition decision whilst in others 
they were required to make this decision within 800ms. They found that in the unlimited time 
trials, the usual WFE occurred, however in the restricted time trails the hit rate for LF words 
was reduced, whilst the false alarm rate remained higher for HF words. They found that the 
hit rate was reduced in this instance due to LF words and HF words receiving about an equal 
number of old responses.   
A reduced or reversed hit rate advantage for LF words with a false alarm rate increase 
for HF words in the WFE are also found in people with dementia (e.g., Balota, Burgess, 
Cortese and Adams, 2002). Balota and colleagues theorised that this reduced hit rate 
advantage for LF words is due to a breakdown in the recollection processes in the brain 
compared to the processes utilised for familiarity. Specifically, they mentioned that 
participants with dementia were unable to focus their attention on bringing forth recollective 
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information and therefore responded on a less taxing and more automatic familiarity process. 
In a second experiment, they were able to demonstrate similar effects in a healthy 
undergraduate student population by requiring participants to make their responses either 
very quickly (500ms) or slightly slower (1000ms). When required to make fast responses 
participants could only rely on familiarity, which was reflected in the results by the reduced 
hit rate advantage for LF words.  
This brief review on the literature on how the WFE is affected by familiarity and 
recollection provides the building blocks for what to expect in regards to the WFE for snap 
decisions. The present study requires participants to make fast recognition decisions, which 
means they will be relying on a sense of familiarity. The literature (e.g., Balota et al, 2002; 
Hoshino, 1991; Joordens & Hockley, 2000) has shown that fast responding results in a 
reduced hit rate for LF words, but a relatively intact false alarm rate for HF words. False 
alarms are not the only type of error that can occur in recognition memory. If an old word is 
incorrectly identified as new, this is known as a miss. As explained by Snodgrass and Corwin 
(1988), misses occur due to a failure of the test item memory strength to reach the ‘old’ 
response threshold. Misses are accounted for in the mirror effect as part of the hit rate, as the 
sum of the probability of a hit and the probability of a miss is 1.0, therefore if the probability 
of a hit is known, the probability of a miss can be deduced.  If fast responding causes the hit 
rate to reduce for LF words, then this means the miss rate increases for LF words.  In the 
present study we are interested in whether following a snap decision, participants will engage 
in a longer processing of their recognition decision and thus engage in recollection to correct 
their false alarms and misses (i.e., by choosing to change their old/new recognition decision). 
If this occurs then the usual WFE should be shown, with an increased hit rate (due to the 
correction of misses) following the second decision. 
Decision Making Models 
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Decision making models address how a decision can be reached, and are important for 
understanding the process that leads to a change of mind decision. Most decision models that 
account for both confidence and reaction time rely on the concept of sequential sampling. As 
described by Smith and Vickers (1988), sequential sampling involves the sampling and 
accumulation of evidence towards a criterion threshold which occurs across three stages. The 
first stage involves coding sensory information into meaningful information the brain can use 
to inform a decision. The second and third stages focus on how evidence is accumulated and 
the stopping criteria for evidence accumulation. These models are able to describe the 
relationship between sampling time and performance accuracy, and thus are useful in 
modelling speed-accuracy trade-off effects (Smith & Vickers, 1988). Some decision models 
propose that the difference between the stimulus sample and the criterion can be used to 
inform confidence judgements immediately if the difference is large, whereas other models 
propose taking multiple samples until the difference is large enough to make a response (Van 
Zandt, 2000). This process of accumulating evidence to make a simple two-choice decision is 
the foundation for both random-walk and race models. 
Van Zandt (2000) explains that both random-walk and race models assume that 
evidence arrives at the latest decision processing stages (i.e., stages two and three) in support 
of one answer over the other, however the processes of storing information is different. The 
random-walk models have one accumulating counter that is pushed towards one threshold or 
the other by the accumulating sum of evidence. This means that accumulation of evidence 
towards one response threshold results in the subtraction of evidence towards the other 
response threshold. Alternatively, race models have an independent counter for each 
response, such that evidence for both counters can accumulate simultaneously, but the 
counter that reaches the response threshold first is the response that is given. Van Zandt 
further explains that both of these models assume that the accumulation process is noisy, 
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meaning that evidence can be incorrectly identified, and that information integration times 
can vary, which can impact on the accuracy of the decision. However, this noise can be used 
to help predict evidence accumulation, such that if a person lowers their response threshold 
they are likely to respond faster but have more errors, whereas a high response threshold will 
have a slower but more accurate response. This is because when the response threshold is set 
high, there is a smaller probability that noise will cause errors in the evidence accumulation 
process.  
Link (1975) and Link and Heath (1975) describe a random walk model in terms of 
their relative judgement theory. This theory proposes that the accumulation of evidence 
occurs in a random walk pattern, but the starting point for the evidence accumulation can be 
anywhere between the two response thresholds. Their model also assumes that the average 
drift rate (i.e., the distance travelled per unit of time; Ratcliff, 1978) towards either response 
threshold remains the same.  
An example of a race model is Vickers’ (1970, 1979) accumulator model. This model 
assumes that two response counters (e.g., counter A and counter B) continuously and 
independently gather evidence for or against their respective response (e.g., response A and 
response B) until one counter reaches its criterion level (threshold). The criterion level for 
each response counter is variable such that is can be subjectively changed depending on a 
person’s motivation, effort, bias or some other factor. This means, in contrast to relative 
judgement theory, instead of the start point being adjusted under bias, the threshold for a 
response in this model is lowered under bias. Vickers (1979) developed the balance of 
evidence (BoE) hypothesis to accompany his accumulator model in order to explain 
differences in confidence. The BoE hypothesis explains that a decision will be made with 
high confidence when there is a large difference between the amounts of evidence 
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accumulated by each response counter. If this difference is small, the decision given will be 
made with low confidence.  
Change of Mind 
A lay conceptualisation of how a decision can be changed is the parallel process 
committee decision model (Rabbitt, Cumming & Vyas, 1978; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977). This 
model proposes that independent committee members cast their ‘vote’ towards a response, 
and that a decision can be based on a few members’ votes. When all members have voted, it 
can be determined if the decision was correct (i.e., the slower votes agreed with the faster 
ones), or if there was an error made (i.e., slower votes disagreed). According to this model 
errors are more likely to lead to a change of mind. Rabbitt and Vyas (1981) tested this theory 
in two sensory discrimination tasks that required quick responses. They found that as 
discriminability became harder participants made more errors and had lower confidence in 
their decisions. However, they found that when participants had longer exposure to the 
stimuli in these difficult trials, they were better at detecting that they had made an error and 
thus correcting it, than when the difficult trials were paired with short exposure times.  
 Change of mind has also been studied in sensorimotor tasks. A study by Resulaj, 
Kiani, Wolpert and Shadlen (2009) required participants to view a random dot motion 
stimulus and move a handle with their hand to one of the two targets they believed the dots 
were moving towards. In some trials they observed that participants changed direction part 
way to a target. They theorised that this was due to the initial hand movement being based on 
partial accumulation of evidence, and that the change of direction occurred due to a full 
processing of all information that resulted in a disagreement with the initial decision. This 
finding has since been replicated in more recent studies (e.g., Burk, Ingram, Franklin, 
Shadlen & Wolpert, 2014; van den Berg et al. 2016). 
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Van Zandt and Maldonado-Molina (2004) examined change of mind decisions under 
bias in a fast two-stage recognition memory task for words. Using Vickers’ (1979) BoE 
hypothesis, they predicted that a bias to respond old would cause participants to change 
correct responses to high bias items and incorrect responses to low bias items more frequently 
than any other items, as at the time of their confidence decision the alternative response 
should have accumulated more evidence than the response given. However, they found that a 
bias to response old equally affected all item conditions, and that the frequency in which 
changes of mind occurred was due to primary decision accuracy and not bias (i.e., 
participants only changed their responses when they had made an error). They therefore 
theorised that after the primary decision, evidence for each response continues to accumulate 
towards a second response threshold. When one counter reaches its second threshold, 
confidence is determined by the difference between the amounts of evidence accumulated for 
each counter. If more evidence has accumulated for the alternative counter then the original 
response is determined to be incorrect and therefore changed.  
Van Zandt and Maldonado-Molina (2004) also investigated whether there would be 
significant differences between the reaction times for consistent responses (i.e., the 
confidence rating reaffirms the old/new recognition decision) and inconsistent responses (i.e., 
the confidence rating changes the initial recognition decision). They found that consistent 
responses were made significantly faster than inconsistent responses, which provides 
evidence that changed responses incur longer processing times, and is a result that the present 
study is interested in replicating.  
Curran, DeBuse and Leynes (2007), using Van Zandt and Maldonado-Molina’s theory 
and design, also studied change of mind under bias in a recognition memory task for words, 
and found that participants changed their mind when their first response resulted in a miss, or 
to correct for another type of error (e.g., false alarms).  
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Aim and Hypotheses 
 The present study is concerned with understanding the effects of making a snap 
decision on episodic recognition memory, with particular interest in whether making snap 
decisions causes errors which can be detected and corrected via a change of mind response. If 
participants are found to be able to detect and correct errors made under time pressure, this 
could have important implications for reducing noise in the data for speed-accuracy trade off 
experiments, and for improving the probability with which decision-making models can 
predict a correct response. The present study therefore aims to investigate the effect of time 
pressure on recognition memory of words of varying frequency (high and low) and 
concreteness (high and low) by requiring participants to make a fast two-stage recognition 
decision. Several hypothesis have been devised from previous research findings in order to 
test this aim:  
1. Mirror effects will be observed independently for both word frequency and for word 
concreteness, with the hit rate portion of the mirror effects being larger for the second 
decision than the first decision.  
2. Recollection will correct misleading familiarity information for new items, meaning 
that there will be a greater rate of change of mind for high frequency new words 
(where familiarity is misleading) than for low frequency new words (where it is not).  
3. Recollection will correct familiarity based misses, as there will be a greater rate of 
change of mind for low frequency old words (where familiarity is misleading) than 
for high frequency old words (where it is not).  
4. Van Zandt and Maldonado-Molina’s (2004) finding that consistent responses are 
made faster than inconsistent responses will be replicated. 
Method 
Participants 
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Fifty-two participants from the University of Tasmania participated in the study. 
Twelve participant’s data files were not used in the analysis of the study. One participant’s 
data file was not saved due to computer error; two participants were removed for having 
more than 10% of non-responses; five were removed for having a final accuracy of less than 
55% and; four were removed for having less than 10 ‘change’ responses. The analysis 
therefore consisted of 40 participants. First year undergraduate psychology students received 
one hour of course credit for participating, whilst other university students had the option to 
receive $15 in remuneration for their time.  
Materials 
The total experimental item set was made up of 2,069 nouns and verbs, of which 
1,536 were used as experimental trials and 533 were used as practice trials. Items were rated 
for word frequency (min=1, max=314232, median=469) and contextual diversity (min=1, 
max=8363, median=294), according to the subtitles lexicon of American English Brysbaert 
and New (2009) norms. Word concreteness ratings followed the Medical Research Council 
psycholinguistic database (MRC; Coltheart, 1981) and referred to the rating for imageability 
scores (min=183, max=667, median=506). The length of each word was between four and 
seven letters.  
A total of 866 words from the original word pool were randomly selected to use for 
each participant’s test session. Twenty-four of these words were used in the practice trial, and 
64 were used as buffer words throughout the experimental trials. Therefore, the experiment 
consisted of 778 test words. Seventeen sub-lists were made, allowing for one practice cycle 
and 16 recognition-memory cycles. Words within each list were randomly assigned and 
counterbalanced for word frequency, contextual diversity, and concreteness. The practice 
cycle consisted of a study list of 12 words, and a test list of 24 words (i.e., the 12 study list 
words and 12 new words). The experimental cycles comprised study lists of 28 words and 
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test lists of 50 words. There were four foil (i.e., buffer) words in each study list, two at the 
beginning and two at the end, with only two of these words randomly selected to be in the 
test list but not analyzed. Foils were included in order to control for primacy and recency 
effects. Each test list in the experimental trials therefore consisted of 24 target words and 24 
new words.  
The memory task was automated by a program written in Python (v.26) language and 
run on an IBM compatible computer with Windows OS, and a QWERTY keyboard. The test 
instructions were displayed on a 24inch colour monitor with 1920x1080 pixel resolution in 
Arial font, size 48.  
Procedure 
Participants were seated in front of a computer and read through the experiment 
instructions at their own pace. Participants undertook key pressing training in order to 
familiarise themselves with the response keys. The required keys to press alternated between 
participants, such that half the participants pressed the old/new keys using their right hand, 
and half pressed the old/new key using their left hand. This means that half the participants 
used their right hand to press the ‘;’ key for an old recognition decision and the ‘.’ key for a 
new decision, and used their left hand to press the ‘z’ for high confidence; ‘x’ for low 
confidence and; ‘c’ for change of mind. The other half of participants used their left hand to 
press the ‘a’ for an old recognition decision and the ‘z’ for a new decision, and used their 
right hand to press the ‘m’ for high confidence; ‘,’ for low confidence and; ‘.’ for change of 
mind. Participants were encouraged to keep their middle and index fingers of one hand on the 
old and new keys, and their index, middle, and ring fingers of the other hand on the 
confidence rating keys.  
Following the key training exercise, participants completed a practice trial. Study list 
words appeared for one second, with a one second break between word appearances. 
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Following the last word in the study list there was a 15 second interval, in which participants 
were reminded on how to respond to words in the test list. The test list followed this short 
break, with words again appearing one at a time. Participants had one second to make their 
old/new recognition decision before being asked for their confidence response. Participants 
were allowed up to five seconds to make their confidence response. The next word in the test 
list appeared after participants had either made their confidence response, or they failed to 
make a response in six seconds. If participants took 750ms or longer to make their old/new 
decision, the message ‘TOO SLOW’ appeared on the screen in red font. The message ‘TOO 
FAST’ appeared in red font if the participant responded in less than 250ms. If the participant 
failed to make any response in six seconds, the message ‘TIME LIMIT EXCEEDED, NO 
RESPONSE RECORDED!’ appeared in red font. Participants were encouraged to avoid 
receiving all three of these messages. The experimenter remained in the room until the 
participant had completed the practice trail in order to answer any questions or resolve any 
confusion about the task. The experimental trials were identical to the practice trial, with the 
exception of word list lengths. At the end of each cycle, participants received feedback on 
their accuracy (out of 100%). At this point, participants were encouraged to improve their 
accuracy in the next cycle by choosing the change option when they were unsure of their 
old/new decision or when they knew they had made a mistake.  
In order to encourage accuracy and speed in their initial response, as well as using the 
change of mind option and having well calibrated confidence (i.e., being more accurate for 
high than low confidence), participants received points following each old/new, 
high/low/change decision they made. The points system worked as follows: for a correct 
old/new decision participants received 1000 minus their reaction time in milliseconds in 
points. They earned an additional 500 points if they responded with high confidence, or 100 
points if they responded with low confidence. If they responded with change of mind, they 
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received zero points. If a participant made an incorrect old/new response, they received zero 
points, if they followed this decision with a high confidence rating they had 500 points 
subtracted from their score, or 100 points subtracted if they responded with low confidence. 
If they chose to change their mind they received 500 points. Participants were encouraged to 
gain as many points as they could.  
Design and Data Analysis 
The study is a 2(word frequency: high, low) x 2(word concreteness: high, low) within-
subjects design. The dependent variables are reaction time (ms), accuracy, and the confidence 
rating response (high confidence, low confidence, change of mind). Generalised (binomial 
probit) linear mixed models were used to analyse the hit and false alarm rates, and change of 
mind rates were analysed using the R package lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker & Walker, 
2015), and inferences were conducted via Wald χ2 tests with type III sums of squares as 
implemented by the car package (Fox, Friendly, & Weisberg, 2013). 
A linear mixed-effect (LME) model is an extension of the standard linear model. 
These models contain both fixed-effects and random-effects, hence the name ‘mixed-effect’. 
Participants are almost always treated as a random effect but experiments such as the present 
one have another source of random variation from the different word stimuli used. Freeman, 
Heathcote, Chalmers and Hockley (2010) advocate using both subject and item random 
effects in the analysis of recognition memory. LME models are run in a hierarchical manner, 
such that the simplest model (e.g., only containing fixed-effects) is compared to a more 
complex model or models (i.e., containing one or more random-effects in addition to the 
fixed-effects) in order to see which model better fits the data. Model fit can be determined 
through either the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Myung & Pitt, 1997), which is 
calculated from the number of parameters in the model, or the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC; Myung & Pitt, 1997), which is calculated from the number of parameters in the model 
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and the total number of observations used to fit the model (Pinheiro & Bates, 2000). In both 
cases, a smaller number indicates a better model fit (Pinheiro & Bates, 2000). 
Generalised linear models (GLM) are the best type of model to use when data is non-
normally distributed, as it utilises link functions to take account of distribution shape 
(McCullagh & Nelder, 1989). Generalised linear mixed-effects models integrate both GLM 
and LME models, making them a powerful analysis tool that can analyse non-normally 
distributed data that also has random effects (McCullagh & Nelder, 1989). For the present 
analyses, where the data are binary, a binomial error model is natural. We assumed the binary 
recognition responses could be approximated by an equal-variance signal detection model 
(Heathcote, 20031) and so used a probit link function (Rouder & Lu, 2005), which is 
equivalent to an analysis of results on the inverse cumulative normal (i.e., z) scale. The 
analysis of response choices was carried out in terms of the probability of responding old 
(i.e., that the test word was studied), which constitutes the hit rate (HR) for studied (old) 
items and the false alarm rate (FAR) for lure (new) items. In signal detection theory 
recognition ability is measured by d’ = z(HR)-z(FAR); in the LME analysis of the probability 
of responding old, reported effects of a factor on d’ correspond to an interaction with a factor 
representing the response type (new vs. old). 
Results 
In the following analyses, the simple models (containing only a random-subject 
effect) were compared to the more complex models, which contained both random-subject 
and random-item effects. Following Freeman et al.’s (2010) advice the more complex model 
                                                             
1 ROC analysis reported in this paper and others supports an unequal variance model, but this 
is not available within the generalized linear model family and so cannot be used with 
standard linear mixed models packages. Hence, we used the equal variance approximation. 
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containing both random-subject and random-item effects was always interpreted. The model 
fits have not been reported in-text but can be found in Appendix D. For ease of reading, the 
analysis is broken down into four parts. The first part analyses data on the first response (i.e., 
the old/new response). The second part analyses the data for the second response (i.e., the 
old/new response taking into account the confidence response high, low, or change). The 
third part analyses data from parts one and two combined.  The fourth part analyses the effect 
of response consistency on reaction time. 
First Response 
 Participant’s old/new responses to words of high and low frequency and high and low 
concreteness were analysed using an ANOVA. There was a significant interaction between 
response type (old/new) and word frequency, χ2(1)=30.2, p<.001, indicating that d’ for LF 
words (0.58) was significantly larger than d’ for HF words (0.43). The mean percentage of 
old responses broken down by word frequency and word concreteness conditions are 
displayed in Table 1. If the probability of a hit rate for LF words mirrors the probability of a 
false alarm rate for HF words, then a word frequency mirror effect is present (Glanzer & 
Adams, 1990). Table 1 shows that the probability of responding old to old items (hit rate) is 
higher for LF words than HF words, and the probability of responding old to lure items (false 
alarm rate) is higher for HF words than LF words, thus the expected word frequency mirror 
effect is shown. The hit and false alarm rates for word frequency were analysed in an 
ANOVA, which shows that the hit rate for old LF words is significantly larger than the hit 
rate for old HF words, χ2(1)=21.9, p<.001 and; the false alarm rate for new HF words is 
significant larger than the false alarm rate for new LF words, χ2(1)=8.54, p=.003.  
A concreteness mirror effect is shown when the probability of a hit rate is higher for 
high concrete (HC) words, and the false alarm rate is higher for low concrete (LC) words 
(Glanzer & Adams, 1990). Table 1 shows the hit rate is higher for HC words compared to LC 
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words, but the false alarm rate is equal for LC and HC words, thus only the hit rate portion of 
the expected word concreteness mirror effect is present. The hit and false alarm rates for 
word concreteness were analysed in an ANOVA, which shows that the hit rate for old HC 
words was significantly larger than the hit rate for old LC words, χ2(1)=10.5, p=.001, but 
there was not a significant difference between the false alarm rates for new LC words and 
new HC words (p=0.69).  
 
Table 1  
First Response Mean Probabilities (%) of Responding Old to New and Old Items Under 
Different Word Frequency and Word Concreteness Conditions 
Stimulus Item HF LF HC LC 
New 41 38 41 40 
 40 38 38 38 
Old 59 62 59 56 
 56 60 62 60 
 
Linear mixed models were used to analyse reaction time (RT) data. When responses 
are made under time pressure, errors (i.e., false alarms and misses) are made faster than 
correct responses (Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998). The effect of first response correctness (C1) on 
RT was analysed in an ANOVA. The expected result was shown as there was a significant 
main effect for C1, χ2(1)=134.1, p<.001, indicating that errors (M=540ms) were made 
significantly faster than correct responses (M=580ms).  
Second Response 
Initial analysis of the second response (which included the previously excluded four 
participants who had less than 10 change responses), suggested that some participants made 
23 
 
 
 
their second response very quickly, indicating that they did not follow instructions to use the 
second response as an opportunity to improve their accuracy. In order to quantify this effect 
we analysed the confidence response RTs with change in accuracy between first and second 
responses using t tests. There was a significant moderate negative correlation between the 
proportion of fast confidence responses, where fast was defined as less than 200ms, and 
change in accuracy, t(42), p<.001, r=-.59, indicating that those who made their confidence 
response quickly were more likely to have a lesser increase in final accuracy. Of those who 
had many fast confidence response RTs, the confidence response they nearly always gave 
was ‘high’. There was a significant moderate positive correlation between mean confidence 
RT and change in accuracy, t(42), p=.002, r=.44, indicating that there was a trend for 
improved accuracy with longer confidence response RTs. Figure 1 shows these trends 
graphically.  
Figure 1. The relationship between fast confidence responders and change in accuracy (left 
hand side) and; the relationship between the mean confidence response RT and change in 
accuracy (right hand side).  
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Participant’s old/new responses to words of high and low frequency and high and low 
concreteness were analysed using an ANOVA. There was a significant interaction between 
response type and word frequency, χ2(1)=84.8, p<.001, indicating that d’ for LF words (1.13) 
was significantly larger than d’ for HF words (0.86). There was also a significant interaction 
between response type and word concreteness, χ2(1)=12.3, p<.001, indicating that d’ for HC 
words (1.05) was significantly larger than d’ for LC words (0.94). The mean probability (%) 
of responding old in the word frequency and word concreteness conditions are displayed in 
Table 2. The hit rate is higher for old LF words than old HF words, and the false alarm rate is 
higher for new HF words than new LF words, thus the expected word frequency mirror effect 
is present. The hit and false alarm rates for word frequency were analysed in an ANOVA, 
which shows that the hit rate for old LF words is significantly larger than the hit rate for old 
HF words, χ2(1)=68.9, p<.001 and; the false alarm rate for new HF words is significant larger 
than the false alarm rate for new LF words, χ2(1)=16.2, p<.001.  
Table 2 shows the hit rate is higher for HC words compared to LC words, but the false 
alarm rate is equal for LC and HC words, thus only the hit rate portion of the expected word 
concreteness mirror effect is present. The hit and false alarm rates for word concreteness 
were analysed in an ANOVA, which shows that the hit rate for old HC words was 
significantly larger than the hit rate for old LC words, χ2(1)=13.8, p<.001, but there was not a 
significant difference between the false alarm rate for new LC words and HC words (p=0.32).  
Linear mixed models were used to analyse RT data. The second response deliberately 
allowed participants longer to make their decision, thus placing an emphasis on considering 
the accuracy with which they had made their first response. When accuracy is emphasised, 
correct responses are made faster than incorrect responses (Swensson, 1972). The effect of 
second response correctness (C2) on RT was analysed in an ANOVA. The expected result 
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was found as there was a significant main effect for C2, χ2(1)=48.6, p<.001, indicating that 
correct responses (M=444ms) were made significantly faster than mistakes (M=454ms). 
 
Table 2  
Second Response Mean Probabilities (%) of Responding Old to New and Old Items Under 
Different Word Frequency and Word Concreteness Conditions 
Stimulus Item HF LF HC LC 
New 31 27 31 31 
 31 28 27 28 
Old 65 72 65 63 
 63 69 72 69 
 
Combined Analysis 
 Part three of the analysis combined data from the first and second response and so 
includes an additional variable R12 with two levels: response 1 (i.e., first response data), and 
response 2 (i.e., second response data). Combining the first and second responses in the one 
analysis is necessary for determining whether changes of mind improved participants 
accuracy (i.e., whether participants corrected their false alarms and misses).  
 R12 and participant’s old/new responses words of high and low frequency and high 
and low concreteness were analysed using an ANOVA. There was a significant three way 
interaction between R12, response type, and word frequency, χ2(1)=9.34, p=.002, indicating 
that the mean d’ difference between LF and HF words for response 2 (0.28) was significantly 
larger than the mean d’ difference between LF and HF words for response 1 (0.15).  
 ANOVAs were used to examine the hit and false alarm rates for R12. The analysis 
was of results on the z-scale, but here they have been transformed into percentages (%) for 
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reporting trends. There was a significant interaction for hit rate between R12 and word 
frequency, χ2(1)=10.9, p<.001, indicating that the mean probability of a hit for HF words is 
larger for response 2 (64%) than response 1 (58%), and the mean probability of a hit for LF 
words is larger for response 2 (71%) than response 1 (61%). There was also a significant 
main effect for R12, χ2(1)=231.4, p<.001, indicating that the difference between the hit rate 
for HF and LF words was higher for response 2 (7%) than response 1 (4%). A significant 
main effect for word frequency was also found, χ2(1)=54.5, p<.001, which indicates that the 
difference in hit rates between response 1 and response 2 for LF words (10%) was greater 
than the difference between hit rates between response 1 and response 2 for HF words (6%).  
The mean false alarm rate (%) for HF and LF words in both response 1 and response 
2 are as follows: response 1 (HF=41, LF=38), response 2 (HF=31, LF=28). There was a 
significant main effect for false alarms for R12, χ2(1)=389.8, p<.001, indicating that the 
difference between the false alarm rate for new HF and new LF words was slightly larger in 
response 2 (3%) than response 1 (2%). There was also a significant main effect for false 
alarms for word frequency, χ2(1)=14.64, p<.001, indicating that the difference between the 
false alarm rate for response 1 and response 2 for new LF words (11%) was larger than the 
difference for HF words (10%).  
Response Consistency 
This final part of the analysis concerned the reaction time for consistent responses 
(i.e., the confidence response reinforces the old/new decision) and inconsistent responses 
(i.e., the confidence response changed the first response). It is expected that consistent 
responses will be faster than inconsistent ones (see Van Zandt & Maldonado-Molina, 2004). 
The analysis was conducted using a linear mixed effects model with the added variable 
‘consistency’.  
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The confidence response RTs, second response decision, and consistency were 
analysed using an ANOVA. There was a significant main effect for consistency, 
χ2(1)=4040.9, p<.001, indicating that inconsistent responses (M=680ms) were significantly 
slower than consistent responses (M=390ms). There was a significant interaction between 
response type and consistency, χ2(1)=31.9, p<.001, indicating that the difference in mean RT 
between consistent and inconsistent new responses was 224ms, with consistent responses 
being faster than inconsistent ones and; the difference in mean RT between consistent and 
inconsistent old responses was 343ms, with consistent response being faster than inconsistent 
ones.  
Discussion 
The present study aimed to investigate the effects of time pressure on recognition 
memory, with particular interest in whether participants could detect and correct their errors. 
Hypothesis 2, hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4 were of primary interest, as these specifically 
looked at the effects of change of mind. Hypothesis 2 predicted that participants would use 
recollection to correct familiarity based false alarms for new HF words more than new LF 
words. Hypothesis 3 predicted that participants would use recollection to correct familiarity 
based misses for old LF words more than old HF words. Hypothesis 4 predicted that 
consistent responses would be made faster than inconsistent responses, thus replicating Van 
Zandt and Maldonado-Molina’s (2004) finding. The results provided some support for 
hypothesis 2, and fully supported hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4. The remaining hypothesis 
was of secondary interest and acted more as a manipulation check. Hypothesis 1 predicted 
that there would be independent mirror effects for both word frequency and word 
concreteness, with an increased hit rate portion of the mirror effect following the second 
response. The results provided partial support for this hypothesis.  
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Hypothesis 2 was only partially supported because the expected reduction in the false 
alarm rate for new HF words was not found. The results showed that the false alarm rate was 
reduced from the first response to the second response, indicating that participants were using 
the change of mind option to correct their false alarms. However, the reduction in the false 
alarm rate for new HF and LF words was about equal, which did not support the hypothesis. 
LF words are less familiar than HF words, thus they usually have fewer false alarms due to 
their lower familiarity (Hoshino, 1991; Joordens & Hockley, 2000; Mandler, 1980). 
According to dual process theories (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas, 
1994) recollection of more elaborative information at the time of the second response should 
have weakened the item strength of the lure word, thus allowing participants to realise their 
mistake. Due to the higher familiarity of HF words, recollection should have had more of an 
impact on the false alarm rate for HF words than LF words. The pattern of results found in 
the present experiment do not confirm the dual process predictions, nor do they falsify them. 
Therefore, more data should be collected in a more powerful design to see if the null 
difference replicates.   
Likelihood ratio theories (e.g., Dennis & Humphrey’s, 2001; Glanzer et al., 1993; 
McClelland & Chappell, 1998; Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997) propose that recognition decisions 
are based on the likelihood ratio of an item being old or new given the strength of the item. If 
participants in the current study were basing their decisions on a likelihood ratio instead of on 
the familiarity distributions of the test items, this may explain why the reduction of the false 
alarm rate for LF words and HF words was about equal. Likelihood ratio models do not 
currently account for change of mind decisions. However, if the models were elaborated it 
would be possible to test whether they are adequate in explaining the results found in the 
present study.  
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 Hypothesis 3 was operationalised in terms of the hit rate, as the hit rate portion of the 
word frequency mirror effect encompasses the probability of the miss rate (see Snodgrass & 
Corwin, 1988). Thus, it was predicted that if the difference in hit rate between old LF and old 
HF words for response 2 was greater than the difference in hit rate between old LF and old 
HF words in response 1, then participants were increasing their word hit rate by decreasing 
the respective miss rate (i.e., by correcting their misses). The hit rate was found to be larger 
for response 2 than response 1 and in the predicted direction, indicating that participants were 
detecting when they ‘missed’ a word and were able to correct this error by using the change 
option. This finding is in line with Curran et al.’s (2007) study that also found that 
participants were correcting their misses as operationalised in terms of the improved hit rate 
following the second response.  
The fourth hypothesis was supported as consistent responses were found to be made 
significantly faster than inconsistent responses. Therefore the present study successfully 
replicated Van Zandt and Maldonado-Molina’s (2004) finding. The significant interaction 
between response type and consistency showed that for both old and new responses, 
responding consistently was always faster than responding inconsistently. These findings 
imply that decisions that are changed undergo a longer processing time than responses that 
are not changed. 
 Hypothesis 1 was partially supported as a word frequency mirror effect (WFE) was 
found, with an increased hit rate for LF words following the second response, but no 
significant word concreteness effect was found following either the first or second response. 
Interestingly, a significant WFE was found for the first response. Balota and colleagues 
(2002) and Joordens and Hockley (2000) in their studies did not find a significant WFE when 
their participants were required to make fast recognition decisions. Their experiments, 
however, required participants to respond even quicker (500ms and 800ms respectively) than 
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in the present experiment (1000ms). Joordens and Hockley theorised that the WFE does not 
occur under time pressured responding due to there not being enough time for participants to 
recollect seeing a word before, thus the hit rate for LF words reduces, but the false alarm rate 
for HF words remains intact as this is not dependent on recollection. Balota and colleagues’ 
experiment compared fast (500ms) responding to slower (1000ms) responding, and found 
that the WFE was not present in the fast condition but was in the slower condition. As both 
Balota and colleagues experiment and the present experiment found a WFE for responding 
within 1000ms, this may indicate that 1000ms is enough time for some recollection to occur 
for LF words, thus keeping the hit rate higher for LF words than HF words and producing the 
word frequency mirror effect.  
A significant WFE was also present for the second decision, and as predicted the hit 
rate for old LF words increased. The proportion of false alarms for new HF words had also 
reduced relative to the first decision. d’ was larger for both LF and HF words in response 2 
compared to response 1, with the mean d’ difference between LF and HF words in response 2 
being larger than the difference between LF and HF words in response 1. Taken together, 
these results imply that the distributions for LF and HF words moved further apart following 
the second response, thus meaning that there was reduced overlap between the distributions 
of HF and LF words, and therefore a reduction in the false alarm rate. This provides further 
support that participants were using the change of mind option to improve their accuracy.   
 The lack of a significant word concreteness effect was due to the false alarm rate 
between HC and LC words not being significantly different. The false alarm rate for LC 
words most likely occurs due to a lack of distinctiveness of the LC lures from memory of the 
study list words, meaning that LC lures either appear orthographically or phonetically similar 
to words that were in the study list, or their semantic meanings are similar to words that were 
in the study list (Glanzer & Bowles, 1976; Hirshman & Arndt, 1997; Wixted, 1992). Glanzer 
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and Adams (1990) explain that the word concreteness mirror effect may not occur when 
words within the test lists are too similar in their concreteness rating. Although the words 
used in the present experiment were rated on concreteness (ranging from 183-667 according 
to the MRC; Coltheart, 1981), it is possible that when they were randomly allocated to the 
test lists they did not differ enough in their concreteness, thus there was not a clear enough 
distinction between HC lure words and LC lure words to produce the false alarm rate portion 
of the concreteness mirror effect.   
There were two key limitations in the present study that impacted the results. The first 
limitation was that participants often made their second response quite fast. This is an issue 
because it may have impacted participant’s ability to use recollection to inform their 
decisions. Yonelinas and Jacoby (1994) argue that recollection responses on average peak 
approximately between 800ms and 1100ms. Participants in the present study made their first 
response (i.e., old/new recognition decision) on average in about 560ms. Combining this with 
a confidence response reaction time of 200ms or less results in a total processing time of 
approximately 700-800ms, and therefore places the final decision outside of the timeframe in 
which recollection peaks according to Yonelinas and Jacoby. If participants had taken more 
time to consider their confidence response, there may have been larger improvements in final 
accuracy (i.e., by correcting more false alarms and misses) than was seen. Future replications 
of this experimental design should therefore consider preventing participants from being able 
to make their confidence response quickly, thus forcing them to slow down and think about 
their response.  The second limitation is that participants generally tended to not use the low 
confidence option. This means that analyses, such as receiver operating characteristics (which 
is a plot of the relationship between the hit and false alarm rates for different confidence 
response ratings; Yonelinas, 1997), could not be conducted on the confidence responses. 
Future replications of this design should therefore also consider including a mechanism to 
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encourage participants to use all of the response buttons equally. For example, in the present 
study participants were encouraged at the end of each cycle to improve their accuracy by 
using the change option when they were unsure of their response. This message could be 
altered to reinforce using all of the confidence response options. 
The present study has shown that following a snap decision, participants are able to 
detect when they have made an error such as a false alarm or a miss and correct it, with 
change of mind responses being made on average within one second of making the initial 
response. These findings have important implications for speeded response experimental 
designs and decision making models. Decision making models should consider including 
parameters in their equations for the probability of an error being corrected, as this will have 
an impact on determining the probability of a correct response being made. Speeded response 
studies should consider including a change of mind option in their experimental designs in 
order to give participants the opportunity to correct their errors and thus reduce noise in the 
data that is created by a slowing down of responses following a known error (see Rabbitt, 
1969).  
In conclusion, the present study was able to show that errors made following a snap 
recognition decision can be detected and corrected, often within one second of making the 
error. The results showed that participants were correcting their familiarity based misses and 
false alarms in order to improve their accuracy. However, the reduction of the false alarm rate 
in hypothesis 2 was eqaul for new HF and LF words which did not supported the hypothesis 
and therefore could neither confirm nor falsify the pattern of results predicted by dual process 
theories. It was recommend that the experiment be replicated with more power in order to see 
if the null result replicates. It was also proposed that if likelihood ratio models are elaborated 
to account for change of mind decisions, then they may also be able to explain the pattern of  
results found in the present study. Nonetheless, the fact that participants could detect and 
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correct their errors has important implications for improving the ability for decision making 
models to predict correct recognition decisions, and for reducing noise in speed-accuracy 
trade-off experimental designs.  
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Appendix B 
Participant Information Sheet 
The Effects of Snap Decision Making on Episodic Recognition 
Memory 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
1. Invitation 
You have been invited to participate in the research being conducted in partial fulfilment of a 
Bachelor of Psychological Science with Honours degree for Ellen-Jane Hickey under the supervision 
of Prof Andrew Heathcote. 
2. What is the purpose of this study? 
The aim of the study is to determine the effects of making a snap decision on recognition memory for 
words. 
3. Why have I been invited to participate? 
You have been invited to participate as you met the requirements for participation (i.e., you are 18 
years or older). If you are a first year psychology undergraduate student you have replied to the 
SONA advertisement. If you are not a first year psychology student then you have seen an 
advertisement for the study and contacted Ellen-Jane with an expression of interest. The choice to 
participant is entirely voluntarily. There will be no consequences should you decide not to participate. 
4. What will I be asked to do? 
You will be asked to make a two-stage decision. First, you will be asked to study a list of words. You 
will then see another list of words, and for each word you will be asked to rapidly decide whether you 
have seen this word before (i.e., did you study it?) or not. Following this decision, you will then be 
asked to rate your confidence on your decision (high confidence, low confidence, or change of mind). 
This process will repeat for every word in each cycle of word lists you see. The entire experiment will 
be conducted here in the cognition lab and will take you approximately one hour to complete. You 
will be given these instructions in more detail along with practice trials prior to starting the 
experimental trials.  
5. Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study? 
There are no direct benefits to participants. The data collected in this research will provide further 
understanding on the effects of snap decision making on episodic recognition memory.  
Directly following the completion of the experiment, first year psychology students will receive one 
hour of course credit via SONA for participating in the study, other participants will receive $15 from 
the experimenter as remuneration for your time.  
6. Are there any possible risks from participation in this study? 
There are no foreseeable risks involved with participating in this study. You may experience some 
fatigue. It is therefore recommended that you take a short break when prompted to.  
7. What if I change my mind during or after the study? 
If you wish to withdraw from the experiment you may do so without explanation up until you 
complete the experiment. It will not be possible to withdraw your data once you have completed the 
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experiment as all collected data is de-identified. This means that your name is not attached to any data 
that is collected, and thus cannot be identified. If you do not want your data to be collected, please 
withdraw before completing the experiment. 
All de-identified data will also be made available to other researchers on an Open Science Framework 
(OSF) site. By signing the consent form you are consenting to your data being collected for the 
current study AND being made available on the OSF site. If you do not want your data made available 
to other researchers on the OSF site, please do not participate in the study, or if you change your mind 
once you have started, please withdraw before completing the experiment.  
If you decide to withdraw part way through the experiment your incomplete data file will be deleted 
immediately.  
8. What will happen to the information when this study is over? 
Your consent form will be stored in a locked filing cabinet in the Cognition Lab. Electronic data files 
will be stored on a password protected server in the Cognition Lab. Hard copy and electronic files in 
the Cognition Lab will be kept for a minimum of five year before being destroyed. However, de-
identified electronic data will be made available indefinitely to other researchers on an OSF site.  
9. How will the results of the study be published? 
The results of this study will be published as part of an honours thesis. Once published, the thesis will 
be accessible through the University of Tasmania library catalogue search function and the results of 
the study will be viewable. Alternatively, you may request a summary of the results by contacting 
Ellen-Jane (hickeyej@utas.edu.au). Results will be available in November. Participants will not be 
identifiable in the published results.  
10. What if I have questions about this study? 
If you have any questions or concerns about the study please contact either Ellen-Jane 
(hickeyej@utas.edu.au) or Andrew (Andrew.heathcote@utas.edu.au).  
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee. 
If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this study, please contact the Executive 
Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network on +61 3 6226 6254 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au. 
The Executive Officer is the person nominated to receive complaints from research participants. 
Please quote ethics reference number H0016517. 
This information sheet is for you to keep. You will be given a separate consent form to read and 
sign should you choose to participate in the study.  
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Appendix C 
Participant Consent Form 
The Effects of Snap Decision Making on Episodic Recognition 
Memory 
 
Participant Consent Form 
1. I agree to take part in the research study named above. 
2. I have read and understood the Information Sheet for this study. 
3. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me. 
4. I understand that the study involves making a two-stage decision in a recognition memory 
task for words. I have read and understood the experiment instructions provided on the 
information sheet.  
5. I understand that participation involves no foreseeable risks. I may experience some fatigue. I 
understand that it is recommended that I take short breaks when prompted to. 
6. I understand that all research data will be securely stored on the University of Tasmania 
premises for a minimum of five years from the publication of the study results, and will then 
be destroyed. 
7. I understand that my de-identified electronic data will be made available to other researchers 
on an Open Science Framework site indefinitely.  
8. Any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. 
9. I understand that the researcher(s) will maintain confidentiality and that any information I 
supply to the researcher(s) will be used only for the purposes of the research. 
10. I understand that the results of the study will be published so that I cannot be identified as a 
participant.  
11. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw without explanation 
up until I complete the experiment.  
I understand that I will not be able to withdraw my data after completing the experiment as it 
will be non-identifiable. 
 
Participant’s name:  _______________________________________________________  
 
Participant’s signature: ____________________________________________________ 
 
Date:  ________________________ 
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Statement by Investigator  
 I have explained the project and the implications of participation in it to this volunteer and 
I believe that the consent is informed and that he/she understands the implications of 
participation. 
If the Investigator has not had an opportunity to talk to participants prior to them participating, the 
following must be ticked. 
 The participant has received the Information Sheet where my details have been provided so 
participants have had the opportunity to contact me prior to consenting to participate in this 
project. 
 
Investigator’s name:  _______________________________________________________  
 
Investigator’s signature: ____________________________________________________ 
 
Date:  ________________________ 
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Appendix D 
Data Analysis Output 
 
D.1: First response generalised binomial probit linear mixed models output 
 
Model fits: 
 df AIC BIC Loglik deviance χ2 χ2df Pr(>Chisq) 
O1.s 9 31901 31976 -15942 31883    
O1.ws 10 31893 31976 -15937 31873 10.055 1 0.0015 
s= random subject effects; w=random item effects 
 
ANOVA (O1.ws): 
 χ2 df Pr(>Chisq) 
NO 141.2177 1 <2.2e-16 
WF 1.5833 1 0.20828 
CC 6.2908 1 0.01214 
NO:WF 30.2428 1 3.812e-08 
NO:CC 4.0876 1 0.04320 
WF:CC 0.3839 1 0.53551 
NO:WF:CC 0.0807 1 0.77640 
NO= new/old response; WF= word frequency; CC= word concreteness 
 
Hit Rate ANOVA (O1.ws): 
 χ2 df Pr(>Chisq) 
WF 21.8747 1 2.91e-06 
CC 10.4754 1 0.00121 
WF:CC 0.3671 1 0.54459 
NO= new/old response; WF= word frequency; CC= word concreteness 
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False Alarm Rate ANOVA (O1.ws): 
 χ2 df Pr(>Chisq) 
WF 8.5458 1 0.003463 
CC 0.1517 1 0.696914 
WF:CC 0.0621 1 0.803200 
NO= new/old response; WF= word frequency; CC= word concreteness 
 
D.1.1: Linear mixed effects model output for first response reaction times 
 
Model fits: 
 df AIC BIC Loglik deviance χ2 χ2df Pr(>Chisq) 
RT1.s 10 5268.2 5351.1 -2624.1 5248.2    
RT1.ws 11 5269.8 5361.0 -2623.9 5247.8 0.3888       1 0.5329 
s= random subject effects; w=random item effects 
 
ANOVA (RT1.ws): 
 χ2 df Pr(>Chisq) 
NO 12.8983 1 0.0003289 
WF 0.0369   1 0.8476350     
CC 2.3669   1 0.1239293     
NO:WF 1.4061   1 0.2357009 
NO:CC 0.4197   1 0.5170855 
WF:CC 0.6841   1 0.4081824 
NO:WF:CC 0.0001   1 0.9919196 
NO= new/old response; WF= word frequency; CC= word concreteness 
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D.1.2: Linear mixed effects model output for first response correctness reaction times 
 
Model fits: 
 df AIC BIC Loglik deviance χ2 χ2df Pr(>Chisq) 
RT1.s 18 5111.9 5261.1 -2537.9 5075.9                            
RT1.ws 19 5113.7 5271.1 -2537.8 5075.7 0.2304       1 0.6312 
s= random subject effects; w=random item effects 
 
ANOVA (RT1.ws): 
 χ2 df Pr(>Chisq) 
NO 12.2034   1 0.000477 
WF 0.0313     1 0.859531     
CC 1.8372   1 0.175284     
C1 134.0645 1 < 2.2e-16 
NO:WF 0.9843   1 0.321129 
NO:CC 0.6965 1 0.403966 
WF:CC 0.7785   1 0.377588 
NO:C1 22.9170 1 1.692e-06 
WF:C1 5.7314 1 0.016664 
CC:C1 2.2222 1 0.136036 
NO:WF:CC 0.0001   1 0.9919196 
NO:WF:C1 6.9351 1 0.008452 
NO:CC:C1 0.5896 1 0.442570 
WF:CC:C1 0.0145 1 0.904085 
NO:WF:CC:C1 0.1971 1 0.657043 
NO= new/old response; WF= word frequency; CC= word concreteness, C1= first response 
correctness 
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D.2: Second response generalised binomial probit linear mixed models output 
 
Model fits: 
 df AIC BIC Loglik deviance χ2 χ2df Pr(>Chisq) 
O2.s 9 34037 34111 -17010 34019    
O2.ws 10 34008 34091 -16994 33988 30.944 1 2.656e-08 
s= random subject effects; w=random item effects 
 
ANOVA (O2.ws): 
 χ2 df Pr(>Chisq) 
NO 4308.5023 1 <2.2e-16 
WF 8.9125 1 0.0028183 
CC 3.6317 1 0.0566886 
NO:WF 84.8394 1 <2.2e-16 
NO:CC 12.3611 1 0.0004384 
WF:CC 0.0853 1 0.7701842 
NO:WF:CC 0.0936 1 0.7596399 
NO= new/old response; WF= word frequency; CC= word concreteness 
 
Hit Rate ANOVA (O2.ws): 
 χ2 df Pr(>Chisq) 
WF 68.8930 1 <2.2e-16 
CC 13.8572 1 0.0001972 
WF:CC 0.1911 1 0.6620423 
NO= new/old response; WF= word frequency; CC= word concreteness 
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False Alarm Rate ANOVA (O2.ws): 
 χ2 df Pr(>Chisq) 
WF 16.1944 1 5.716e-05 
CC 0.9926 1 0.3191 
WF:CC 0.0001 1 0.9938 
NO= new/old response; WF= word frequency; CC= word concreteness 
 
D.2.1: Linear mixed effects model output for second response reaction times 
 
Model fits: 
 df AIC BIC Loglik deviance χ2 χ2df Pr(>Chisq) 
RT2.s 10 49215 49297 -24597 49195    
RT2.ws 11 49217 49308 -24597 49195 0 1 1 
s= random subject effects; w=random item effects 
 
ANOVA (RT2.ws): 
 χ2 df Pr(>Chisq) 
NO 53.3138 1 4.73e-13 
WF 5.0059  1 0.025261 
CC 0.2898  1 0.590367 
NO:WF 2.5528   1 0.110102 
NO:CC 9.8409  1 0.001707 
WF:CC 1.1916  1 0.274999 
NO:WF:CC 0.0523 1 0.819165 
NO= new/old response; WF= word frequency; CC= word concreteness 
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D.2.2: Linear mixed effects model output for second response correctness reaction times 
 
Model fits: 
 df AIC BIC Loglik deviance χ2 χ2df Pr(>Chisq) 
RT2.s 18 49140 49290 -24552 49104    
RT2.ws 19 49142 49300 -24552 49104 0 1 1 
s= random subject effects; w=random item effects 
 
ANOVA (RT2.ws): 
 χ2 df Pr(>Chisq) 
NO 53.0113  1 7.206e-14 
WF 3.0921     1 0.078671 
CC 0.1072 1 0.743319 
C2 48.6399 1 3.076e-12 
NO:WF 1.3896   1 0.236954 
NO:CC 8.5947 1 0.003371 
WF:CC 1.2020 1 0.272922 
NO:C2 32.7423 1 1.052e-08 
WF:C2 0.5211 1 0.470394 
CC:C2 0.2668 1 0.605476 
NO:WF:CC 0.0954 1 0.757434 
NO:WF:C2 4.0930 1 0.043061 
NO:CC:C2 2.6505 1 0.103518 
WF:CC:C2 0.5694 1 0.450515 
NO:WF:CC:C2 0.7610 1 0.383013 
NO= new/old response; WF= word frequency; CC= word concreteness, C2= second response 
correctness 
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D.3: Generalised binomial probit linear mixed models output for combined first and second 
response 
 
Model fits: 
 df AIC BIC Loglik deviance χ2 χ2df Pr(>Chisq) 
O12.s 17 67482 67634 -33724 67448    
O12.ws 18 67119 67280 -33541 67083 365.14 1 <2.2e-16 
s= random subject effects; w=random item effects 
 
ANOVA (O12.ws): 
 χ2 df Pr(>Chisq) 
R12 7.6167 1 0.0057830 
NO 5276.6677 1 <2.2e-16 
WF 5.6228 1 0.0177287 
CC 6.1707 1 0.0129882 
R12:NO 563.2737 1 <2.2e-16 
R12:WF 2.2249 1 0.1358035 
NO:WF 105.9609 1 <2.2e-16 
R12:CC 0.0865 1 0.7687260 
NO:CC 0.0281 1 0.8669344 
WF:CC 0.0281 1 0.8669344 
R12:NO:WF 9.3421 1 0.0022394 
R12:NO:CC 1.2918 1 0.2557175 
R12:WF:CC 0.4801 1 0.4883791 
NO:WF:CC 0.0102 1 0.9195010 
R12:NO:WF:CC 0.2489 1 0.6178620 
R12= combined response 1 and response 2 data; NO= new/old response; WF= word 
frequency; CC= word concreteness 
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Hit Rate ANOVA (O12.ws): 
 χ2 df Pr(>Chisq) 
R12 231.3853 1 <2.2e-16 
WF 54.4863 1 1.565e-13 
CC 14.0572 1 0.0001773 
R12:WF 10.9142 1 0.0009543 
R12:CC 0.3456 1 0.5566034 
WF:CC 0.0001 1 0.9938831 
R12:WF:CC 0.6947 1 0.4045748 
R12= combined response 1 and response 2 data; NO= new/old response; WF= word 
frequency; CC= word concreteness 
 
False Alarm Rate ANOVA (O12.ws): 
 χ2 df Pr(>Chisq) 
R12 389.8509 1 <2.2e-16 
WF 14.6428 1 0.0001299 
CC 0.1048 1 0.7461302 
R12:WF 1.3272 1 0.2493024 
R12:CC 1.1096 1 0.2921751 
WF:CC 0.0171 1 0.8959944 
R12:WF:CC 0.0297 1 0.8631760 
R12= combined response 1 and response 2 data; NO= new/old response; WF= word 
frequency; CC= word concreteness 
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D.4: Response consistency reaction time output 
 
Model fits: 
 df AIC BIC Loglik deviance χ2 χ2df Pr(>Chisq) 
RTCON.s 18 45411 45560 -22688 45370    
RTCON.ws 19 45413 45571 -22688 45375 0.0052 1 0.9423 
s= random subject effects; w=random item effects 
 
ANOVA (RTCON.ws): 
 χ2 df Pr(>Chisq) 
NO 66.2851 1 3.902e-16 
WF 7.5161 1 0.006115 
CC 2.2495 1 0.133654 
CON 4040.9612 1 <2.2e-16 
NO:WF 5.5218 1 0.018781 
NO:CC 6.2154 1 0.012664 
WF:CC 0.5936 1 0.441022 
NO:CON 31.9008 1 1.622e-08 
WF:CON 0.0043 1 0.947671 
CC:CON 0.4060 1 0.524011 
NO:WF:CC 0.0041 1 0.948893 
NO:WF:CON 2.1311 1 0.144336 
NO:CC:CON 0.4443 1 0.505069 
WF:CC:CON 1.0044 1 0.316238 
NO:WF:CC:CON 0.2746 1 0.600265 
NO= new/old response; WF= word frequency; CC= word concreteness, CON=second 
response consistency 
 
